Intuitions in Moral Reasoning – Normative Empirical Reflective Equilibrium as a Model for Substantial Justification of Moral Claims

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Abstract

Moral questions and dilemmas in everyday life prompt us to take a normative stance. Sometimes we rely on our moral intuitions and make judgments accordingly. In other cases, we feel the need for more extensive deliberation of a moral case. After a judgment is made, we have to ask: Can we justify our moral view to others who may have come to a different conclusion? A main theory that is put forward to seek justifiable resolutions is Reflective Equilibrium (RE). In a nutshell, RE is a coherentist model for moral justification in which the key idea is that we “test” various parts of our system of beliefs (including considered moral judgments, principles, relevant facts and background theories) against the other beliefs we hold. We aim to modify the model of RE in such a way that the moral experience of agents other than the thinker can play a role.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLibrary of Ethics and Applied Philosophy
EditorsM. Christen, C. van Schaik, J. Fischer, M. Huppenbauer, C. Tanner
Place of PublicationDordrecht
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media B.V.
Pages179-193
Number of pages15
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-01368-8
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Publication series

NameLibrary of Ethics and Applied Philosophy
Volume32
ISSN (Print)1387-6678
ISSN (Electronic)2215-0323

Keywords

  • Background Theory
  • Moral Intuition
  • Moral Judgment
  • Moral Reasoning
  • Reasoning Process

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